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Abstract
Empirical software engineering has received much attention in recent years and coined the shift from
a more design-science-driven engineering discipline to an insight-oriented, and theory-centric one. Yet,
we still face many challenges, among which some increase the need for interdisciplinary research. This is
especially true for the investigation of social, cultural and human-centric aspects of software engineering.
Although we can already observe an increased recognition of the need for more interdisciplinary research in
(empirical) software engineering, such research configurations come with challenges barely discussed from
a scientific point of view. In this position paper, we critically reflect upon the epistemological setting of
empirical software engineering and elaborate its configuration as an Interdiscipline. In particular, we (1)
elaborate a pragmatic view on empirical research for software engineering reflecting a cyclic process for
knowledge creation, (2) motivate a path towards symmetrical interdisciplinary research, and (3) adopt five
rules of thumb from other interdisciplinary collaborations in our field before concluding with new emerging
challenges. This supports to elevate empirical software engineering from a developing discipline moving
towards a paradigmatic stage of normal science to one that configures interdisciplinary teams and research
methods symmetrically.
Keywords: Empirical Software Engineering, Interdisciplinary Research, Symmetrical Collaboration,
Science & Technology Studies
1. Introduction
Starting as a byproduct in a hardware-dominated
world, software has become the main driver for en-
tire industries and a transformative power in many
fields of contemporary society. Software engineer-
ing practice and research are likewise continuously
evolving to cope with the emerging challenges im-
posed by its ubiquitous nature: practical, institu-
tional, and cultural contexts of software are dy-
namic and in constant change, and as they influ-
ence the shape and direction of software develop-
ment, boundaries between systems and application
domains become fuzzy. Software engineering to-
day typically takes place in settings where we need
to address, inter alia, application domain-specific
questions (e.g. on domain-specific terminologies,
concepts, and procedures), ethical questions (e.g.
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moral assessments in context of safety-critical sit-
uations), juridical questions (e.g. on data privacy
or regulations of algorithms and their environment
respectively), psychological questions (e.g. on im-
provements of team communications or working en-
vironments), or social and political questions (e.g.
on societal impacts of software-driven technologies,
the concerns of heterogenous actors, or accountabil-
ity issues). Human actors – whether customers, end
users, or developers – and their interests, needs,
and values, but also their cognitive capabilities,
fears, experiences, and expertise render software
development endeavours as something individual
and unique rather than something standardised and
strictly formalised. In the end, software is devel-
oped by human beings for human beings and what
works in one organisational context might be com-
pletely alien to the culture and needs of the next.
This poses new challenges for configurations of
actors, skills, and methods in research and practice,
as well as on the education of future software engi-
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neers (and end users). Although we can already see
more and more calls for more interdisciplinary re-
search and the integration of non-technical skills in
higher education (see, e.g., [1, 2]), the calls and pro-
posals – especially those in Software Engineering –
concentrate largely on educational aspects, e.g. on
how to reduce the gap between isolated disciplinary
conditions in academia and multidisciplinary real-
life conditions in practice (see, e.g., [3, 4]). In-
terdisciplinary research, however, comes with chal-
lenges barely discussed from a scientific, epistemo-
logical point of view in the software engineering
community. Fields like health care and medicine,
biology and neuroscience, or education have explic-
itly tackled such issues in the last two decades, in
parts driven by the need to reflect on conditions of
success of NSF and EU funding initiatives to in-
tegrate “ethical, legal and social issues / aspects”
(ELSI/ELSA). Here, scholars discussed and defined
“multidisciplinary”, “interdisciplinary” and “trans-
disciplinary” research to classify the different chal-
lenges and opportunities that arise from such con-
figurations [5, 6, 7]:
• Multidisciplinary projects involve researchers
from various disciplines addressing a common
problem in parallel (or sequentially) from their
disciplinary-specific bases integrated by assem-
bling results in a common book or workshop.
• Interdisciplinary projects build on a collabo-
ration of researchers working jointly, but each
still from their disciplinary-specific basis, to
address a common problem
• Transdisciplinary projects involve researchers,
practitioners and actors from governance agen-
cies, NGOs or companies trying to work out
a shared conceptual framework instrumental-
ising concepts, approaches, and theories from
their parent disciplines.
Being involved in inter- and transdisciplinary
projects in stem cell research, neuroscience or urban
planning, scholars have argued that even interdis-
ciplinary collaborations involving only researchers
from two or three disciplines create challenges very
close to those formerly discussed only in the case of
transdisciplinary projects: without investing time
and effort (and money) into the search for com-
mon problems, a provisional but common language,
and institutional backup, interdisciplinary projects
tend to turn into multidisciplinary ones. This holds
true already for “close” interdisciplinary collabo-
rations between fields like industrial automation
and software engineering. More pressing, but also
more rewarding research challenges, as we will ar-
gue, emerge when trying to integrate research on
the social, cultural and human-centric practices and
contexts of software engineering. Dealing with is-
sues that arose from the proliferation of tools and
frameworks and the complexity growth in software
engineering projects, software engineering has al-
ready turned itself into an evidence-driven empir-
ical discipline, commonly known as empirical soft-
ware engineering. However, the emerging major
challenges need far more symmetrical forms of in-
quiry and design going beyond not only the prefer-
ence for rationalism and formal reasoning still dom-
inant in large parts of software engineering research,
but also beyond the forms of empiricism already in
place. They give rise to the need of symmetrical in-
terdisciplinary research configurations at eye level
to come to valid, but still manageable solutions to
the problem of balancing different epistemic and
practical requirements and standards.
Placing symmetrical interdisciplinary configura-
tions at the heart of empirical software engineer-
ing research – especially when involving social, cul-
tural, and human-centric facets – has effects on the
way that software engineering as a field can ad-
dress questions central to defining it as a scientific
discipline, such as What qualifies as (good) scien-
tific practice?, What counts as theory, as method-
ology, and as evidence? or How are scientific con-
troversies opened up, embraced, and closed? Like
in other inter- and transdisciplinary configuration,
many conceptual problems and methodological is-
sues in our field cannot be organised in terms of
one single and dominant epistemological framework
if we do not want to close down necessary and
fruitful exchanges. Because of the high diversity
of socio-economic and technical factors that per-
vade software engineering environments, it is – not
only from a practical and pragmatic perspective,
but also from an epistemological point of view –
not sufficient to just use methods and concepts from
various disciplines in our research, but we need to
effectively integrate methods and research compe-
tences from the various disciplines.
Contribution. In this position paper, we crit-
ically reflect upon the broader epistemological set-
ting of empirical software engineering and elaborate
its configuration as an “Interdiscipline”. We will
argue for stopping to treat empirical software engi-
neering as a developing discipline moving towards a
paradigmatic stage of normal science, but as a con-
figuration of interdisciplinary teams and research
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methods - an interdiscipline. To this end, we will
make the following contributions: We (1) elaborate
a pragmatic view on empirical research for software
engineering that reflects a cyclic process for knowl-
edge creation, (2) motivate a path towards sym-
metrical interdisciplinary research, and (3) adopt
five rules of thumb from other interdisciplinary col-
laborations.
The key addressees of this manuscript are
twofold: (1) Scholars who are new to empirical soft-
ware engineering (or parts of it) in general and in-
terdisciplinary research in particular, and (2) schol-
ars already aware of the importance of empirical re-
search methods and interdisciplinary research, and
interested in a broader epistemological view.
Outline. We will first briefly elaborate on
the epistemological, methodological, and pragmatic
background of research methods already used in
empirical software engineering and highlight conse-
quences for theory building, methods development,
and application as well as for interdisciplinary col-
laborations (Sect. 2). We use those insights to elab-
orate a pragmatic view on empirical research for
software engineering that reflects a cyclic process
for knowledge creation in Sect. 3. In Sect. 4, we will
discuss currently pressing challenges in empirical
software engineering, show how they are grounded
in basic controversies, and conclude by outlining a
roadmap to turn empirical software engineering into
an interdiscipline in Sect. 5.
2. Scientific Movements and Practices
– in a Nutshell
In response to the emerging challenges in soft-
ware engineering, we have already seen a significant
turn towards empirical approaches. Various contri-
butions have baptised the shift from a more design
science-oriented discipline driven by the application
of scientific concepts and methods to practical ends
to a more insight-oriented and theory-centric dis-
cipline as empirical software engineering [8, 9, 10].
This turn towards empiricism in software engineer-
ing research and practice can be understood merely
as a surplus to formal design orientation and as
an avenue to turn the conceptual, theoretical, and
mathematical work in computer science into more
easily adoptable tools for practical applications in
software engineering projects “out of the lab, and
into the wild”. It can, however, also be understood
as an epistemic intervention to turn software engi-
neering into a field dealing with empirical evidence
and methodologically gained insights.
The consolidation of an empirical software engi-
neering community is not happening in a straight-
forward and united manner, but as the estab-
lishment of various, sometimes competing, sub-
communities: while initial debates focussed mainly
on issues of “rationalism versus empiricism”, we can
today still observe some separate camps under the
common banner of empiricism, focussing on issues
like “qualitative studies vs. quantitative studies” or
“students vs. professionals” (as subjects) [11]. In
this manuscript, we will not even try to address the
social mechanisms within the research communities
to the extent they deserve, but briefly reflect and
reason about the epistemological setting to moti-
vate the challenges in our still emerging field. An
insightful introduction into the evolution of empiri-
cal software engineering can be taken from the per-
sonal perspective provided by Victor Basili, one of
the pioneers in the field [10].
In the following, we briefly highlight important
concepts and major historically grown, and often
competing, views on science as a form of knowl-
edge and practice. We do not intend to discuss ap-
proaches to the philosophy of science in detail, but
only to the extent necessary for shedding light onto
the ongoing debates and struggles in empirical soft-
ware engineering in its attempt(s) to understand
and position itself as a scientific endeavour. An ex-
cellent introduction into the philosophy of science
and its evolution can be taken from [12].
2.1. The Ghosts of Rationalism and Empiricism
Depending on the weapons of choice regarding
epistemology – the theory of knowledge – and on-
tology – the study of what exists – there are various
attempts to define what the ultimate goal of science
is and how it is best achieved. In the 17th cen-
tury, when science as an institution was still young,
members of the newly founded Royal Society were
trying to define and defend a set of practices both
different from seeking truth in religious texts and
the alchemistic attempt to turn copper or iron into
gold or quicksilver. Rationalists (or intellectualists)
like Descartes or Hobbes argued that because there
is no serious link between a “res extensa” – a realm
outside – and the “res cogitans” of our minds [13],
the only way to valid knowledge is deducing univer-
sal truths from basic principles using reasoning by
geometry and mathematics. Empiricists like Hume
or Boyle argued on the contrary that certain, if not
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all scientific problems cannot be deduced from ba-
sic principles – simply because we cannot prove the
axioms and reasoning tends to favour logical spec-
ulation – and that we need to look for empirical
proofs [14]. This turned the search for knowledge
into a never ending process of induction, i.e. the at-
tempt to infer general rules from particular cases.
The struggle about the right way to institutionalise
modern science was fierce: Hobbes and Boyle, for
example, attacked each other not only intellectu-
ally, but also personally and politically [15].
Rationalism and Empiricism both have very dis-
tinct consequences in respect to what counts as
“theory” or “truth” and although no serious ap-
proach in the philosophy of science today would re-
peat the old arguments for or against either of the
two, the controversy is revived again from time to
time in the form of implicit assumptions of what
counts as “good”, “sound”, or “rigorous” science.
Some of the arguments for or against empirical ev-
idence in many engineering fields today still follow
these old lines of demarcation (see also Sect. 4).
2.2. The Rise and Fall of the Unity of Science
At the beginning of the past century, an infor-
mal group in Vienna that started to discuss such
diverse works as the writings of Duhem, Lenin, and
Frege served as a breeding ground to some of the
most pressing problems in the philosophy of science
of that time. The so-called Vienna Circle tried to
rework some of the basic premises of empiricism to
link them with modern logic and therefore, even-
tually, overcome the differences between inductive
and deductive strategies. Some of its suggestions
include the use of so-called “protocol sentences” to
standardise the translation of sensory data into rea-
sonable input for logical calculus [16], i.e. the use
of verification as a principle to distinguish the sci-
entific use of language from its misleading natural
language sibling or the ultimate search for a “unity
of science”[17, 18] where any concept, theory, and
statement of any potential disciplinary background
is both empirically grounded and formulated in a
common framework. One might say those sugges-
tions were all not successful, but they failed in
fact so big that their ghosts still haunt us today.
The idea of a unified science, for example a science
with one language (mathematics, logic, and verified
statements about observations in those rare cases
where mathematics and logic are simply too com-
plicated), still hinders fruitful exchange in interdis-
ciplinary projects – both in cases of close disciplines
such as theoretical and experimental physics and in
cases of projects that try to connect knowledge from
domains further apart.
Two of the biggest critical publications refuting
some of the main arguments of Logical Positivism
– Karl Popper’s “Logik der Forschung” (The Logic
of Scientific Discovery) [19] and Thomas Kuhn’s
“The Structure of Scientific Revolutions” [20] –
were published in the Vienna Circle’s monograph
series. Popper famously argued against verification
and for falsification of hypotheses1 as a hallmark of
the validity of a truth claim: No matter how hard
we try, we can never verify a statement by induc-
tive reasoning, but we can falsify it when a single
observation does not fit our general rule (cf. null
hypothesis testing). Kuhn, on the other hand, ar-
gued that it is only true for some time periods that
science works the way that Popper said: problem-
and puzzle-solving, conservatively sticking to the-
ories, methods and statements that have not yet
been falsified. But even in the “hardest” of all
sciences (physics, chemistry or astronomy), history
is full of revolutionary overturns, where paradigms
shift, believes radically change, and where what-
ever was understood as true had to be evaluated
once more in the light of a new paradigm. Accord-
ing to both, any scientific statement is only true
as long as it fits the current paradigm – a socially
accepted system of believes, preferred procedures,
and unquestioned doctrines in a given field – and
as long as it is not critically refuted by an empirical
observation that, again, is only valid in the light of
a current paradigm.
2.3. Collaborations and Science Wars
Progress in science can only move forward
through empirical observations as there are no other
options for falsification. However, both the valid-
ity of theory and observation are bound to the so-
cial and cultural mechanisms of approval and ac-
ceptance of a paradigm by respected peers that
are in many cases more related to judgements of
“novelty”, “relevance”, or even “aesthetics” (con-
sidering, e.g., mathematical work). This might not
cause problems in coherent peer groups working in
a “normal science” mode under a shared paradigm,
but it can cause massive controversies in times of
1When building and evaluating theories, we cannot test
the theories themselves, but their consequences via hypothe-
ses which are statements proposing a suitable explanation of
some empirical phenomena [21].
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paradigm shifts in one field and even more chaos
when paradigms from different fields collide.
During the 1970’s and 1980’s, such collisions
caused a massive outrage on both sides when
anthropologists, historians, linguists, semioticians
and sociologists started conceptually and empiri-
cally to treat the practices, organisational mech-
anisms, and cultural patterns in scientific labo-
ratories “symmetrically” [22, 23]: they observed,
analysed, and interpreted the day-to-day work of
science (experimenting, testing, writing, arguing,
creating careers) like they treated any other field
of practice in modern societies (families, political
parties, market-based trading, . . . ) [24, 25]. This
caused what became known as the “Science Wars”,
in which each side accused the other of ignorance,
stubbornness, and even hostility [26, 27].
It is reasonable to say that the struggles were un-
productive and unnecessary, to say the least, and
a closer look at their historical background shows
that they were mainly fueled by material and sta-
tus interests that instrumentalised epistemological,
methodological, and ontological arguments. And
although the last three decades have seen various
productive and insightful collaborations between
scholars from very different backgrounds – anthro-
pologists and biologists working together on life sci-
ence issues, historians and geologists working to-
gether on understanding the effects of human inter-
vention into ecosystems, sociologists and computer
scientists working together on Human-Computer-
Interaction problems or critical algorithm design –
some resemblances of the science wars can still be
observed from time to time when issues of authority
(or funding) are involved.
2.4. Theory, Research, and Evaluation as Practice
The most fruitful collaborations between schol-
ars from various backgrounds build on a very sim-
ple, but particularly hard to accept insight: Sci-
ence – the construction, testing, and evaluation of
theories, models, arguments, experiments, and ev-
idence – is, if taken seriously, not an abstract and
universal search for truth. It is a set of practices,
institutions, and processes structured by changing
rules, norms, and paradigms. In fact, there is noth-
ing absolute about truth and there is no such thing
as a universal way of scientific practice [28]. What
counts as a valid claim, a rigid approach, or a jus-
tified belief is relative to what counts as the shared
standards and interpretations of validity, rigidity, or
justification in the respective fields and subfields of
scientific practice. Concepts and empirical meth-
ods have very specific purposes – exploratory or
explanatory, oriented towards depth or overviews,
towards theory-generating or theory-testing – each
relying on different forms of empirical data – quali-
tative or quantitative, procedural or categorical, ob-
servational or transactional. Such an understand-
ing of science as a practice (and culture) [29] has
been corroborated both in the field of “Science
& Technology Studies”, an interdisciplinary field
connecting engineers and philosophers, mathemati-
cians and historians, computer scientists and sociol-
ogists to empirically study how science and the de-
velopment of technologies is actually done in labs,
offices, or at conferences [30] and by arguments de-
veloped by pragmatist philosophers of science.
Following the early works of John Dewey [31] and
Charles S. Peirce [32] from the early 20th century,
pragmatist thinkers and empirical researchers have
argued that even if it is not possible to develop
and justify a gold standard for what counts as pure
and well defined scientific practice, one can work
with something like a least common denominator.
Dewey famously argued that any search for knowl-
edge is following a common and ever repeating pro-
cess of taking something for granted, experiencing
an unsettlement of that belief, search for different
hypotheses, and experimenting in order to test hy-
potheses before re-settling a new belief. While clas-
sic rationalists argued for deduction as a basic prin-
ciple of science – an application of a general rule to
a particular case by inferring a specific result – and
classic empiricists argued for induction – the infer-
ence of a general rule from a collection of particular
cases –, pragmatists argue for a constant back and
forth. As long as there is no particular reason for
doubt, the search for knowledge works by deduc-
tively applying explicitly or implicitly known rules.
But if that application of taken for granted beliefs
fails, the search for knowledge switches to an induc-
tive mode until the situation is settled again and
deduction is again possible. Peirce formalised that
pragmatic insight in his works on logic and infer-
ence and proposed that there is a more hypothet-
ical form of inference linking both – an inference
that he later called abduction – an educated, but
hypothetical guess of the best explanation.
Summarising the resulting three principles:
• Induction describes the inference of a general
rule from a particular case: If one selects a
sample of beans from a bag (case) and all se-
lected beans are white (result), then all beans
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from this bag must be white (rule).
• Deduction describes the application of a gen-
eral rule to a particular case: If all beans from
a bag are white (rule) and a particular bean
is from the bag (case) then this bean will be
white (result).
• Abduction describes the (creative) synthesis of
a case from a general rule and a particular re-
sult: if all beans from a bag are white (rule)
and there is a handful of white beans available
(result), then this handful is (probably) from
the bag.
If taken as a practice moving back and forth
through the application of these three principles,
we can connect them in the form of an “empirical
life cycle” introduced next.
3. Pragmatic Cycle for Empirical Research
Methodologies that are built upon pragmatist ar-
guments have already shown that at least qualita-
tive research has to be understood as an iterative
process of generating empirically grounded theories
from a repetition of induction, abduction, and de-
duction until a useful theoretical maturity has been
reached.
We now extend that idea in our attempt to cap-
ture an empirical life cycle that visualises knowl-
edge creation in general as an iterative theory
building and theory evaluation process as shown
in Fig. 1. This process captures and combines the
different concepts and principles introduced in the
previous section yielding a pragmatic life cycle for
empirical research such as in software engineering.
Figure 1: Pragmatic cycle for empirical research.
Our empirical life cycle recognises that there is
nothing absolute about truth and that there no such
thing as one universal way of scientific practice, but
that there are many different and valid (and com-
plementary) ways of undertaking research. There
is no single, empirically inquired point of view that
will ever provide us with an entire picture when
interpreting relevant phenomena.
Considering, for example, techniques to elicit
software requirements, effectively testing the sensi-
tivity of these techniques to practical contexts and
building robust theories would require a combina-
tion of:
1. (Inductive) observational studies to explore
practical real-life contexts and relevant param-
eters (such as constraints and objectives),
2. building concepts in relation to existing the-
ories that consider both system-theoretical
modelling aspects and socio-economic aspects
alike (such as expectations on how specific
techniques would yield improvements),
3. (deductive) quasi-controlled experiments to
corroborate concepts by testing the expected
improvements, and
4. scaling up to practice via in-vivo studies and
replications to increase the robustness of the
emerging theory.
This example alone shows that even if consider-
ing theory building as the pragmatic iterative cycle
of constant theory building and evaluation it is, it is
still not a straight-forward one. In fact, there exist
multiple paths through our lifecycle by applying dif-
ferent methods in different orders (e.g. from quan-
titative to qualitative investigations or vice-versa).
Every empirical method, may it be a survey, a case
study, or a controlled experiment, has its place in
this lifecycle and the appropriateness of the method
chosen and the underlying data type (qualitative
or quantitative) depends on the research question
asked. Theory building and evaluation is an iter-
ative practice where theories are revealed, set into
context to existing evidence and concepts, and con-
tinuously “tested” to refine them and increase their
robustness and validity.
4. Challenges in Empirical Software Engi-
neering
Although the importance of empirical approaches
in software engineering research and practice is al-
ready acknowledged, our still young field faces vari-
ous challenges when it comes to provide robust sci-
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entific theories. The interdisciplinary nature, the
uncertainties of decisions on requirements or crite-
ria for evaluating quality or usefulness, the depen-
dencies of domains and the heterogenous stakehold-
ers involved, and the growing complexity of soft-
ware development processes open up very different
avenues for empirical investigations ranging from
mining software repositories to interviewing stake-
holders or conducting in-depth case studies. The
closeness of software engineering phenomena to the
judgment by the individuals involved therein makes
it inherently difficult to build general principles and
theories; central questions are often heavily depen-
dent on a socio-economic context where the bound-
aries are difficult to capture because of the inter-
related human, economic, technological, and also
cultural factors involved.
As an analogy for highlighting the difficulties and
limitations in theory building, a comparison with
other evidence-based disciplines, such as medical re-
search, can be drawn [8]. There, large sample sizes
and constant replications are generally accepted for
proper (statistical) conclusions while this is exactly
what is so difficult in software engineering research.
In software engineering, it is not only difficult to
draw large sample sizes2, but also to reason about
their representativeness. We have, in fact, very lim-
ited knowledge about true populations and their
characteristics, especially when it comes to used
methods, technologies, and development processes
and their stakeholders: How many requirements en-
gineers do generally exist? How many in Germany?
What are their responsibilities and their levels of
expertise? A further problem, finally, consists of
that knowledge acquisition in software engineering
is yet not always in tune with the pace of changes in
our cases under investigation (e.g., industrial prac-
tices) [33].
All this often feeds critical voices who reject the
value of empirical research at all postulating, for ex-
ample, that “our inability to carry out truly scien-
tific experiments [...] will yield anecdotes of limited
value” [34]. However, while we agree that outside
the flavour of pure mathematics – which is often
preferred by those opposing empiricism as the ba-
sis for theory building – there is no certainty at
all, it is empiricism that allows us to advance as
a community to better reason about software en-
gineering practices under realistic conditions. Soft-
2At least when considering larger units of analysis such
as “Software Projects”.
ware engineering always takes place under very spe-
cific and complex conditions that involve contexts,
processes, and practices that, even if in some cases
at least approximately expressible in mathematical
terms, as in the case of economic indicators, cannot
be integrated in a unified model. If the ultimately
failed search for a unity of science (Sect. 2.2) has
taught us anything, then it is the epistemological
and pragmatic insight that a standardised language
– of mathematics, of modern logic, of “truly” com-
parable protocols – cannot be the gold standard
for knowledge production. While we agree that
the narrative and interpretative accounts created
by empirical research have always only limited va-
lidity until a next iteration of our empirical life cycle
comes up with refutations or specifications, they are
the only way to bring software engineering research
closer to the context and conditions for which soft-
ware is developed and in which software is used.
4.1. The State of Empirical Evidence
Although recent developments have improved
our empirical understanding of software engineer-
ing practices and processes, the current state of ev-
idence is still weak when compared to other more
mature fields. A large extent of our everyday prac-
tice in software engineering is still governed more by
conventional wisdom than it is governed by empir-
ical evidence. This is especially true for the social,
cultural, and political aspects of software engineer-
ing, such as early stages of development, rendering
the inference of robust theories inherently problem-
atic.
Even though we can observe an increase of em-
pirical studies in the various fields of software en-
gineering research, many studies still do provide ei-
ther circumstantial evidence by focusing on isolated
contexts without taking into account the relation
to existing evidence or – worse – they neglect the
context completely. The effects are portrayed by
Jacobson’s observation in context of the SEMAT
initiative [35]: software engineering is gravely ham-
pered by (1) the prevalence of fads more typical of
fashion industry than of an engineering discipline;
(2) the lack of a sound, widely accepted theoretical
basis; (3) the huge number of methods and method
variants, with differences little understood and ar-
tificially magnified; (4) the lack of credible exper-
imental evaluation and validation; and finally (5)
the split between industry practice and academic
research. The consequence of the current situation
are best described by Wohlin et al. saying that
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“there exists no generally accepted theory in soft-
ware engineering [...]. Some laws3, hypotheses and
conjectures exist, but yet no generally accepted the-
ory” [36]. As a matter of fact, a large extent of
the theories (or theory patterns) we have for soft-
ware engineering are still transferred from theories
in other disciplines (e.g. organisational psychol-
ogy), sometimes by adopting them, but mostly by
transferring them verbatim [37].
Software engineering itself however is often still
governed by folklore turned into facts [38]. Sim-
ilarly as in other fields before, many theories spe-
cific to software engineering emerged from the early
times of the discipline where empiricism had no
significance at all and where claims by authorities
where often treated as facts. One prominent ex-
ample for such a “fact” is grounded in the well-
known essay by Edsger Dijkstra Go To Statement
Considered Harmful [39] from 1968, largely based
on reasoning by argument and triggering a public
exchange between different scholars via published
notes (all considering the previous note as “harm-
ful” itself). Although this exchange fostered an
important and fruitful debate in the community
at that time, it still remained largely a public ex-
change between scholars based on reasoning by ar-
gument. This did not change until 2015, nearly 50
years lager, when Nagappan et al. [40] published the
results of their large-scale study analysing C code
from GitHub repositories and suggesting that the
use of goto statements in practice does not appear
to be harmful.
Despite the positive developments towards em-
pirical research, software engineering claims are still
often judged based on the number, faith, and vocal
energy of their protagonists, and “facts” are often
taken for granted based on dogmatic statements by
authorities rather than based on empirical evidence.
Exemplary symptoms of the resulting folklore are
illustrated in Tab. 1.
Folklore and its grounding in common sense and
conventional wisdom is, if understood from a prag-
matist point of view, a form of taken-for-granted
knowledge that is routinely used to frame known
and unknown situations alike. But unlike the pro-
visional beliefs that govern the empirical life cycle of
scientific practice, folklore is backed up by so many
different social and political mechanisms (dogma,
3We consider a law to be a purely descriptive, analyti-
cal theory about phenomena without explanations for the
phenomena.
influence of its protagonists, or the search for fame,
to name just a few), that it is not doubted when
an empirical observation does not fit. Even worse:
it is this dismissal of unfitting empirical evidence
in accounts that use folklore that as an effect fuels
the troubling belief that empirical evidence in gen-
eral is not able to cast doubt on what is already
“commonly known”.
4.2. From Conventional Wisdom to Evidence
If software engineering research wants to over-
come this grounding in conventional wisdom and
universal theories, then a change towards evidence-
based, theory-centric and context-sensitive soft-
ware engineering research is necessary [45]. This
has been more and more understood and accepted
over the last years and the growing empirical soft-
ware engineering research community is fostering,
in fact, great progress in methodological and sci-
entific rigour [46], also by establishing standard-
ised approaches and method guidelines to empirical
software engineering (ranging from systematic map-
ping studies [47] to case study research [48]). Yet,
the path towards empiricism and robust theories in
software engineering remains stoney as there is still
a lot of uncertainty and confusion about the choice
of appropriate configurations of research methods
and about how to align new results with existing
evidence – a hallmark of any insight-oriented scien-
tific practice.
The trouble with building a reliable body of
knowledge in any form of scientific practice is that
there is no simple solution to it. There exists a
variety of causes rooted in the lack of...
• ...(methodological) awareness in less empiri-
cally oriented software engineering sub-fields
• ...appreciation of qualitative studies even in
empirically oriented software engineering sub-
fields
• ...empirical data disclosure (from study proto-
cols to the actually analysed data itself)
• ...transparency and replicability often emerg-
ing from the lack of (open) data
• ...appreciating replication studies and the re-
porting of null results
• ...recognising context-specific conditions and
the relation to existing evidence
• ...adoption of empirical research methods from
other disciplines to software engineering con-
texts
Although there is an increased awareness among
scholars from various software engineering research
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Table 1: Exemplary Folklore in Software Engineering
Example: Goal-oriented RE. One example for the low state of empirical evidence can be seen in the field of goal-oriented
requirements engineering (GORE) with a dominance of GORE solution proposals not reflected in industrial everyday
practice. Horkoff et al. [41] analysed in a systematic literature review, including 966 papers published by 2016, 246 papers
in detail. Out of these, 131 indicate to include a case study. While at first sight maybe positively surprising, a subsequent
study by Mavin et al. [42] revealed that only 20 of these 131 case studies were actually conducted in practical in-vivo
settings. In contrast, a large-scale investigation on the status quo and problems in RE indicates to that roughly 5% of
industrial environments rely on this RE technique at all (see also www.napire.org). While this does certainly not imply
that the practical relevance of the contributions is weak, it implies that we have little knowledge about their relevance and
impact, let alone their practical conditions and effects. We could argue that many of these contributions provide solutions
to problems not yet well understood.
Example: Chaos Report. It is difficult to mayor in software engineering without learning about the Chaos report figures
by the Standish group providing figures on reasons for software failures and, in particular, cost overruns. While those figures
are still frequently cited, there exist many reports already (e.g. [43, 44]) providing sufficient evidence-based arguments to
doubt the validity of the Chaos Report and raise questions on major methodological flaws in how the figures were revealed.
As the Standish Group never disclosed the data, a more accurate analysis (or replication) is, however not possible; yet it
remains frequently used by researchers and (e.g. policy) advisors to support their own claims and hopes.
Causes and Effects. Both examples could not be more different and yet they share similar causes and effects. As an
empirical (cross-cutting) community, we are still far from a common ground with standards that hold among the various
software engineering (sub-)communities and cultures. This fuels research projects isolated from practical contexts, thus,
yielding conventional wisdom rather than evidence and creating, in turn, more folklore which, when being cited just often
enough, at some point becomes accepted as universally true in the communities (remaining then difficult to eradicate).
(sub-)communities, only addressing as many of
these issues as possible can yield a fruitful path
towards robust software engineering theories and
concepts. Otherwise, the theories we reveal re-
main context-independent and universal and, thus,
not applicable to specific context situations as they
would require folklore, conventional wisdom or edu-
cated guessing to make them work in specific cases.
In those cases they are useful, they still study too
often observable, quantifiable effects only (“what is
happening?”) rather than providing explanations
for core mechanisms in the phenomena (“why is
it happening?”), as pointed out by Jørgensen in
his keynote to the 12th International Symposium
on Empirical Software Engineering and Measure-
ment [49].
As already shown in Sect. 3, it is simply impos-
sible to build robust theories with single-method
studies alone or by relying on a specific data type
only. Theory building and evaluation is a contin-
uous iterative process relying on a variety of dif-
ferent empirical methods and each individual in-
quiry needs careful consideration of context factors
and the relation to existing evidence. Otherwise,
all we reveal are universal theories that are built
upon apodictic arguments when what we need first
is a solid basis with context-specific theories and
explanations having survived multiple attempts for
refutation.
The path towards interdisciplinary research is
surely not the sole measure of success to solve all
the issues discussed above. The research commu-
nity needs to further work on shared and accepted
practices for empirical studies, for replication stud-
ies, and for data sharing, and it needs to further
disseminate those practices into other software en-
gineering communities. As mentioned earlier, we
are already making great progress in this direction
reflected, for example, in the increase of method-
ological guidelines to empirical research (see, e.g.,
[48, 47, 50, 51, 52, 53], just to name a few selected
ones) or in open science policies and initiatives to
recognise shared data sets becoming more and more
prominent in software engineering venues (see, e.g.,
the open science policies established in recent em-
pirical software engineering conferences and jour-
nals).
It is, however, still far from reasonable to be-
lieve that we can yield robust software engineer-
ing theories by relying on one paradigmatic disci-
plinary framework only and by forcing every other
approach into its rigid form.
4.3. From Discipline to Interdiscipline
When it comes to integrating different forms of
knowledge and evidence from other disciplines and
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subfields, a strategy under the umbrella of one sole
epistemological framework has shown to be not very
promising. This is already true in the case of close
interdisciplinary cooperations (integration of, for
example, different fields of engineering), but is even
less viable when it comes to making use of evidence,
concepts, and methods used in fields and disciplines
that focus on more human-centric issues. Such an
integration of multiple disciplines is necessary and
has already been recognised as the only effective
way to reach a more realistic understanding of hu-
man involvement in software engineering endeav-
ours [54]. This human involvement should not be
treated as a simple facet that plays a minor role, be-
cause it eventually characterises largely how whole
areas of our discipline (and with them the use of ap-
proaches, methods, and tools) manifest themselves
in practice; for instance:
• early stages of development being sensitive to
the particularities of domains, organisational
contexts, and the various stakeholders involved
(each with own hopes, desires, and beliefs),
• software process models that specifically aim
at team cultures and values (e.g., agile devel-
opment),
• software project organisation and management
topics including planning and effort estima-
tion,
• Security Engineering, in particular those as-
pects having a human-centric dimension (e.g.
social engineering), or
• more generally, human-centred engineering (as
inherent to, e.g., HCI).
Building concepts and theories that effectively
include the social, cultural or, in general, human
aspects (cognitive capabilities, belief systems, val-
ues) cannot be addressed by pure rational reason-
ing – human practices, institutions, and values are
purely rational in very rare cases only, if at all [55].
However, it can also not be effectively addressed
within one sole epistemological framework, but only
via a combination of methods and approaches (and
skills). The use of single empirical methods is not
sufficient anymore, but we need to triangulate by
means of using various methods in combination.
5. Turning Empirical Software Engineering
into an Interdiscipline
Addressing the emerging, especially human-
centric challenges in software engineering research
needs both recognising and addressing all chal-
lenges described above as they affect the effectiv-
ity of all forms of scientific practice, as well as
establishing new forms of empirical inquiry that
go beyond the capacities of a sole epistemological
framework. The latter can only be reached with
more symmetrical interdisciplinary research config-
urations at eye level to come to valid, but still man-
ageable solutions to the problem of balancing dif-
ferent epistemic standards. In the following, we
elaborate on these forms of collaborations before
concluding with some new challenges they bring.
5.1. Establishment of Symmetrical Collaborations
When transferring approaches, concepts, and
methods from other disciplines, we not only adopt
their application, but also the underlying theories.
For instance, when employing qualitative methods
like interviews or observations to explore practical
contexts and social and cultural mechanisms in-
volved therein, we do not only rely on a specific
technique, but also on existing theories from so-
cial science, organisational studies, or psychology.
For software engineering practice and research alike
there barely exists such thing as greenfield engineer-
ing anymore. Existing theories from related fields
and disciplines need to be considered and carefully
set in relation to each other. In our requirements
engineering example above, if taking it to an ex-
treme, even system-theoretical modeling concepts
and social theories need to be carefully set in rela-
tion to each other as both include structural mech-
anisms each with similar or even overlapping con-
cepts (e.g. regarding the notion of “interaction” or
“trust”). It is naive at best and ignorant at worst
to believe that a balanced combination of exper-
tise can be achieved by research team configura-
tions stemming from one discipline alone. However,
the history of science, as discussed in Sect. 2.2, has
also shown that aiming high and for a unification
of concepts, methods, and approaches for inter- and
transdisciplinary research is also not very effective.
The most pragmatic way towards a balanced
combination of methods and domain expertise, we
argue, is to set up flexible interdisciplinary col-
laborations and to shift from treating empirical
software engineering as one singular discipline but
as an “interdiscipline” where social, cultural, and
human-centric issues shape the configurations of
questions, research methods, and teams in the same
way as mathematical models and procedural guide-
lines do already. We already argued that scholars
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from Science & Technology Studies – an interdis-
cipline integrating actors, concepts, and methods
from social sciences, humanities, natural sciences,
and engineering to study the various relations be-
tween science, technology, and society – have de-
veloped forms of in-depth collaborations mainly in
the life sciences, health, or biology that go beyond
just adding “ethical, legal and social aspects” to
projects and consortiums in these fields.
We believe that these forms of collaboration can
also be very helpful for empirical software engineer-
ing research and practice especially when tackling
so-called “wicked problems” [56, 57, 58]. As Liegl
et al. argue in the case of integrating ethics – one
field of wicked problems – into the design of emer-
gency response systems, such an approach is also in
tune with the outlines of the current E.U. “Horizon
2020” funding framework, but needs experimental
designs for collaborations, stakeholder integration
as well as time and effort to treat the ethical and
social implications as an ”object of collective and
ongoing negotiation, which needs to be done in situ
and hand in hand with end-users and other stake-
holders” [59]. Balmer et al. proposed five general
rules of thumb for such “post-elsi” interdisciplinary
collaborations in general (and not only focussing on
ethics, but on all kind of human-centric issues) [60],
and which we can thus adopt to interdisciplinary
empirical software engineering:
1. Collaborative experimentation: The configu-
ration of methods and approaches in specific
projects need to be worked out experimentally
and collaboratively. Instead of just plugging in
some methods and concepts from one discipline
last minute in an already designed project of
the other discipline, the setup of research ques-
tions and respective methods should be worked
out together and it is advisable to carefully
plan in advance for finding a common, provi-
sional language.
2. Taking risks: Interdisciplinary collaborations
involve risks, both professionally and person-
ally. Major publication outlets and funding
programs are and will be in the near future
still organised on disciplinary terms leaving in-
terdisciplinary journals, conferences, and fund-
ing schemes still the exception. Getting col-
laborative works published is difficult, to say
the least, given the differences in paradigmatic
standards or even in writing styles. This is
true also personally in terms of career develop-
ment. But we have ourselves experienced it to
be worth the risks: engaging in collaborations
early takes time, but it makes engaging in in-
novative and interesting projects later easier.
3. Collaborative reflexivity : Reflexivity – the ap-
plication of a scientific standard and the empir-
ical life cycle repeatedly to ones own practice,
concepts, and methods – is the only way to
move away from intellectual stubbornness and
sticking with folklore and conventional wis-
dom. But it can turn into a dangerous ally,
leading to infinite navel-gazing [61]. Collabo-
rative reflexivity – confronting each other both
with insights and concepts as well as prejudices
and biases – is challenging, but a very effective
way to move forward.
4. Opening-up discussions of unshared goals: In
interdisciplinary collaborations, there are var-
ious individual and disciplinary expectations
about the goals of the collaboration. Such col-
laborations will lead to more responsible inno-
vation or better economic and organisational
fit. Those expectations, however, are quite
often not completely shared personally and
judged against the standards of the respective
home disciplines. Integrating time slots and
spaces for open debate about unshared goals
helps in this regard.
5. Neighbourliness: There is no need for all par-
ticipants in interdisciplinary collaborations to
share all standards and practices and to strive
for becoming alike. Treating the other disci-
plines as neighbours and as equals means en-
gaging in boundary work [62, 63] and in search-
ing for common objects, artefacts, and con-
cepts that can also be used in individual disci-
plinary ways.
5.2. The Rise of New Challenges
To turn empirical software engineering into an
interdiscipline, we argued so far that we need to
engage in coalitions with experts from other disci-
plines, such as social science or psychology, instead
of treating each other as mere byproducts. This af-
fects the design of multi-method programmes and
the explicit consideration of theories and concepts
from other disciplines instead of building various
isolated new ones. More precisely, given our current
state of evidence, we believe that it is important to
concentrate on context-specific concepts and expla-
nations as a basis for more useful and viable theories
in the future that embed and link existing theories
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from various disciplines instead of just transferring
them verbatim from the other disciplines.
Establishing this new perspective on empirical
software engineering as an interdiscipline poses,
however, new challenges such as:
1. When can and should existing theories from
other disciplines be transferred (verbatim) to
the software engineering body of knowledge,
when should they be effectively integrated in
parts only, and when do they need to be
adapted?
2. Where and how do established method stan-
dards need to be modified to enable the ef-
fective design of manageable-sized short-term
studies as well as long-term interdisciplinary
research collaborations?
3. How can we effectively disseminate already
exiting method standards across the exist-
ing software engineering research communities
(e.g. dealing with human-centric dimensions)
so that the empirical software engineering com-
munity does not only preach to the choir?
4. How can and should future software engineer-
ing researchers be educated?
Despite all well-meant attempts so far to imple-
ment inter- and trans-disciplinary training and eval-
uation schemes, these are still largely oriented to-
wards specific disciplinary standards [64]. Given
the high diversity of disciplinary professional back-
grounds in empirical software engineering, it is of-
ten difficult if not impossible to find a common
ground on the principles and terms established so
far. At the same time, the young age of our field
also creates a unique chance to enhance the het-
erogenous approaches in empirical software engi-
neering we have in place ranging from in-depth case
studies to large scale statistical approaches in the
various software application domains.
6. Conclusion
Software engineering research is more and more
confronted with challenging questions that increase
the need for interdisciplinary research. This es-
pecially holds when considering the human-centric
facets in our field. Although we can already observe
an increase in the call for more interdisciplinary
research and studies investigating interdisciplinary
topics, interdisciplinary research comes with addi-
tional challenges barely discussed from a scientific
(epistemological) point of view.
In this position statement, we have reflected upon
the evolution and epistemological setting of empir-
ical software engineering in the attempt to position
itself as a scientific practice. Based on the lessons
from the history of science, being full of contro-
versial and in parts competing movements, and re-
flecting social mechanisms of in parts competing re-
search communities, we have:
1. Elaborated a pragmatic view on empirical re-
search for software engineering that recognises
not a gold standard for scientific practice, but
that reflects its cyclic nature in an attempt to
undertaking research relying on various forms
of methods, data sources, and theories from
various disciplines.
2. Motivated a pragmatic path towards a bal-
anced combination of methods and domain
expertise via flexible, symmetrical, interdisci-
plinary research.
3. Adopted five rules of thumb from other, more
experienced fields of deep interdisciplinary col-
laborations and pointed to new challenges.
We argued, in particular, for the need for sym-
metrical coalitions between empirical software en-
gineering researchers and researchers from other
evidence-based disciplines to shift from treating em-
pirical software engineering as one singular develop-
ing discipline moving towards a paradigmatic stage
of normal science, but as an interdiscipline. In
such an interdiscipline, social, cultural, and human-
centric issues shape the symmetrical configurations
of questions, research methods, and teams, which
pose, however, new challenges on research practice
and higher education. While we cannot propose
quick solutions to these challenges, we postulate the
need for a richer discussion of these in our research
community and beyond. We know that such col-
laborations and approaches take time, effort (and
funding) and that every attempt to open up spaces
for symmetrical collaborations also results in trade-
offs in terms of disciplinary standards. But we be-
lieve that we will otherwise not be able to cope with
today’s complex social, cultural and human-centric
questions in software engineering in the long run.
Our hope is that with this manuscript, we there-
fore not only oppose the stubborn voices who are
still generally critical towards empiricism, but that
we add to the voices of those defending the values
of empirical research in software engineering in gen-
eral and interdisciplinary research in particular.
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